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The self in neuroscience and psychiatry
  1. T J Crow

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    Edited by Tilo Kircher, Anthony David. Cambridge: Published by Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp 466. £30.00 (paperback), ISBN 0-521-53350-3

    This is a thought provoking book. Tilo Kircher and Anthony David have persuaded 22 authors to write on aspects of the self. The title might be “The self and schizophrenia” for this is the central focus. In his chapter Parnas makes this explicit:

    “The most fundamental level of selfhood that appears to be affected in early schizophrenia is the automatic pre-reflective articulation of the first person perspective” (page 217)

    and quotes Bleuler:

    “Ganz intakt ist dennoch das Ich nirgends”

    “The I is, however, never completely intact” to this effect. The proposal is that by attacking the self as a concept and dealing with its scientific and philosophical implications one can arrive at a more fundamental understanding of the nature of schizophrenia than Bleuler’s concept that it is a disorder of association. However, the implications are wider than this.

    To be sure there are some disagreements and differences in emphasis between the contributors. Thus Berrios and Marková in a characteristically thorough historical survey conclude that the self is “fundamentally a western construct” to be explained by means other than neurobiology. Bentall writes:

    “To many hard-nosed biological scientists, the self might seem an almost metaphysical concept” (page 301)

    and quotes Baumeister:

    “Providing a satisfactory definition of the self has proven fiendishly difficult. It is what you mean when you say “I”. Most people use “I” and “self” many times each day, and so most people have a secure understanding of what the self is – but articulating that understanding is not easy”.

    Phillips writes:

    “Sartre and Heidegger come to mind as philosophers who reject the notion that there is anything like a human nature or natural self-development …” (page 320)

    These quotations provide …

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