particular theory. Morton Prince’s ‘co-consciousness’ he considers to be simply a dissociated state of personal consciousness. Freud’s ‘fore-conscious’ he identifies with the ‘ultra-marginal’ level of the mind (that is to say, conscious states which are not only outside the field of attention, but even beyond the margin of personal consciousness). Freud’s ‘unconscious’ he regards as a dissociated portion of the same ultra-marginal level. Thus, for Professor Moore, the ‘fore-conscious’ and the ‘unconscious’ together make up what he terms the ‘subconscious’.

Cyril Burt.


In this work Freud re-examines certain psychic phenomena, both normal and pathological, which cannot be explained by the pleasure-pain principle. He follows Fechner’s definition of pleasure and pain as being conditions of stability and instability respectively. He recognizes the warring of all the particular instincts in their search for stability in a comprehensive ego, and points out, as he has often done before, that many neurotic and other manifestations may be explained as the effort of these impulses, especially sex, to achieve pleasure in face of the reality principle. Beyond this, however, he finds himself forced to recognize a repetition compulsion which does not and cannot achieve pleasure, to explain certain phenomena such as the dreams of the ‘shock neuroses’, amongst which he includes most of the war cases.

He recognizes the selective and time-space reference functions of the higher (cortical) levels of mind which raise a barrier in respect to stimuli from without, but points out that there is no such barrier against over-stimulation from within. These stimuli are chiefly concerned with the feeling of pleasure and pain, and it is an effort to establish barriers against these which determines projection. The traumatic neuroses are considered as being due to the breaking down of the barrier against external stimuli. The final armament of this barrier is apprehension, which charges the defences against assault, and the dreams of these traumatic cases are not wish fulfilments but efforts to re-establish this apprehension, and with it the barrier against stimuli without which the pleasure principle cannot act. These dreams then, together with those of the psychic traumata of childhood, are dependent on the repetition compulsion. This repetition compulsion is regarded as an example of a deep-seated organic ‘law’ which is illustrated by heredity, the migration of birds, etc., and which many of the instincts subservice. Freud concludes that the tendency of instincts is essentially towards conservative repetition of previous states: the sexual life instincts towards continual recurrence of the starting-point of development, and the rest towards death, though the path to death is continually modified and elaborated by the reactions of the environment. The apparent impulse to progress in certain human beings he attributes to the constant demand for satisfaction in the shape of return to primitive states and the
resistances offered by reality. These resistances force the individual continually to try new paths, and thus impel him to change and experiment. The tendency of life processes is to lead to a stability, a relaxation of tension to pleasure, and so to death; but the process of conjugation introduces a new stimulus mass, and so leads to increase of tension, i.e., to life.

Admittedly in this study he leaves many loose ends to be followed in the future; but it is a remarkable development from the narrow and cramped standpoint of the past. Psycho-analytic investigation, if followed out on these lines, which permit of a much more biological interpretation than has ever before been possible to the strict Freudian, is likely to lead to much more general acceptance and a wider range of utility. The author is inclined to over-emphasize his apology for a change of view; but most will agree that this is a sign of grace rather than a reason for censure.

R. G. Gordon.

Suggestion and Common Sense. By R. Allan Bennett, M.D. (Lond.), M.R.C.P. Pp. 105. 1922. Bristol: John Wright & Sons Ltd. 6s. net.

A cynical remark made by the late Dr. Mercier twenty years ago has affected the author to such a degree that he regards psychology as a 'strange doctrine' and has shunned it ever since. This is perhaps not the ideal attitude in which to approach the subject of suggestion, and within these pages there is little which is worthy of perusal. In the first chapter, on "Psychology and Organic Life", a broad and rational viewpoint is taken on the conception of mind. The organism is viewed as an integrated mass of differentiated cells in which special groups have their own psychological possibilities. When, however, suggestion (all suggestion being regarded as self-suggestion) is dealt with, the lines of Baudouin are more or less strictly followed, and we cannot see that 'common sense' dissociated from well-established modern scientific knowledge will aid any psychotherapeutic advance. Psycho-analysis for Dr. Bennett is anathema, so that he thinks that patients requiring such a form of treatment were 'better dead'! The trend of the book is somewhat retrogressive, and it can hardly be considered useful either from the theoretical or practical standpoint.

C. S. R.


Herein nine dramatic plays which have been presented upon the stage in recent years are analytically examined. Such a study vividly illustrates the various unconscious conflicts and solutions to such conflicts which the drama portrays, and renders such human problems clearer. The drama is looked upon as a useful and ready outlet for too severely restrained emotions, and also as allowing a constructive representation of these. Theatre attendance therefore acts as a relief to mental repression, and helps in the recognition of vital factors within. The authors regard stage art