Reviews and Notices of Books.


It is pleasing to find a common subject treated in an uncommon way. In these days it is surely unusual to meet with a manual of psychotherapy that is not saturated with Freudian doctrine and practice, although the author is well aware of the advantages of Freudian method on occasion. There were brave men before Agamemnon, and able psychotherapists before Freud. Not one of the least of the merits of this book is its insistence on the value of methods elaborated long before the war by workers whose names seem less prominent than they were. Dr. Ross adopts an eclectic attitude, but it may be said that his method of choice is based on the 'rational' psychotherapy of Dubois (whose name, curiously enough, we do not appear to have noticed in the book) and of Dejerine. Like the latter, he makes of his patient un peu un ami. For the great majority of cases technique of this character proves satisfactory. It is undesirable to wield a hammer to crack a nut—though many seem to forget the wisdom of this. For any disease that is common, simple and easily applied methods are required. The neuroses are common enough; why should their treatment necessitate year-long séances?

Dr. Ross's volume is written in a strain of shrewd common sense, and is permeated by the thinking of a mind which is more practical than theoretical. By far the greater part is taken up with the treatment of neurasthenia—a morbid state which the author hesitates to define with conviction, but considers is caused by 'overaction in the attempt to meet' the difficulties of life. That is, the cause is 'faulty adaptation'; the symptoms are somatic and mental, with fatigue in the foreground of the picture. If we inquire, why this overaction? we are met with the confession that it is the expression of an 'unknown factor of great determining power,' viz., constitution or diathesis, which is inborn or hereditary. It is admitted that the 'make-up' of the neuropath is not that of the majority of men. If neuropaths are born and not made, the ground for treatment is no doubt cleared, but is the latter thereby facilitated? Can the Ethiopian change his skin? In view of the excellent results apparently obtained by Dr. Ross, with his combination of psycho logical and physical treatment (though he seems somewhat to depreciate employment of the latter, in spite of the fact that, on page 179, his patient is still left lying in bed), we naturally wonder whether
the acquired factors are not at least as important as the innate. Curiously, as we think, Dr. Ross minimizes the significance of the physical agents in the production of 'nervous breakdown.' We do not find any adequate appreciation of the proven fact that much of the asthenia of neurasthenia is 'suprarenal asthenia,' amenable to treatment along endocrinological lines. He seems to get somewhat entangled in his own views of fatigue, for it is regarded at one time as a cause, at another as a symptom. Dr. Ross doubts whether a "lowered potential of nerve energy can last for months or years," causing neurasthenic symptoms over a prolonged period, and holds that physical fatigue "is a thing that is recovered from quickly." We cannot agree with him here; we are convinced, on the contrary, that persistent physical fatigue may result from persistent underaction of glands, that it may continue for years, and be permanently relieved by appropriate glandular therapy. Because a fatigue state is not cured by rest, it by no means follows, as Dr. Ross maintains, that its cause is psychical. A patient with glandular underaction may rest ever so long, but the cause will remain unaffected by that rest.

One of the many interesting parts of the book is the author's apologia, as it were, for the change in orientation which twenty years' experience has given him. Beginning as a convinced 'Weir-Mitchell-ite,' he has developed into a 'faith healer' in the genuine sense. The sheet anchor of his treatment is faith and hope. He believes that the endocrine "successes which are quoted at present must be considered as having been achieved by the same means as those employed by the gynaecologists of old, the means of faith in a method." True to this conception, Dr. Ross maintains that in cases of impotential coeundi physical methods (e.g., aphrodisiac drugs) do good merely by restoring confidence to the patient. We think that in these and similar instances the author is unintentionally a little unfair. We accept the results equally with him; we do not accept his interpretation of the mechanism.

Dr. Ross should not, we would remind him in a friendly spirit, discuss the differential diagnosis of 'organic' and 'functional' at all unless in a thorough-going way. His criteria (page 206) are open to criticism. Many a case of "paraplegia without bladder symptoms or the tendency to bedsores" is not functional, but organic; "a spastic paraplegia without Babinski's sign or clonus is also functional," but, alas! it may also be organic; "inability to speak accompanied by fluency in writing is not aphasia," yet some organic cases show precisely this combination, as Dr. Ross's inspirer, the late Professor Dejerine, could have told him.

But what matters this and other criticism? It is long, indeed, since we have read a book on psychotherapy in which the best features in all varying methods are utilized and the unnecessary ignored, in which the technique of their practical application at the bedside is cultivated assiduously, in which, above all, the author lays himself out to discuss the actual treatment of actual symptoms. For this last reason, if for no other, the burdened practitioner owes Dr. Ross a debt of gratitude. It is a book which he who runs may read.

The very wide field that is covered by the contents of this considerable volume makes a critical review of the whole out of the question. In reading it, it becomes noticeable that Jung has given the barest outline of some ideas he had in mind when writing it, and has to some extent made it a task to carry further than he has hitherto done the differentiation of types, to trace their influence in history and find characteristic examples among writers and poets. The book is thus two things—a presentation of the fact that psychological types exist, and of a method of formulating them; and a narrative of certain ideas. This narrative is somewhat concealed behind the outer pageant of types. The book is difficult reading. It treads continually on the wriggling bodies of ideas, that are felt rather than seen. From the outer aspect of the book alone, the reader on finishing it might say, "Jung says there are four functions, those of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Every person has one or other of these functions most developed, and the remainder subsidiary. Each of these functions can be orientated to an outward or inward goal—extraverted or introverted. He regards the problem of neurosis from the angle of types, seeing the cause of neurosis to lie in the overdevelopment of one function and underdevelopment of the others, and tracing this to the effect of civilization, that produces onesidedness. The therapeutic aim is to develop the undeveloped functions, so that a balance of functions is attained. Therefore, in therapeutic work we must first ascertain the type, and the main function, and then endeavour to cultivate the subsidiary and undifferentiated functions." Something like this is probably destined to become the textbook 'explanation' of Jung for future students of the psychologic art. What is ironical in the situation is that this book, the soul of which breathes out an atmosphere beyond systems, must become itself a system, if it is accepted by the world. Its concluding words are: "To deny the existence of types is of little use in face of the fact of their existence. In view of their existence, therefore, every theory of the psychic processes must submit to be valued in its turn as a psychic process and, moreover, as an existing and recognized type of human psychology. Only from such typical presentations can the materials be gathered whose co-operation shall bring about the possibility of a higher synthesis." Such a synthesis means transcending type in oneself. The man in the street can well cry out that the psychologists can do it first. If such a thing is possible, it would be able to exist only within a limited area. This further possible extension might be the future direction of psychology.

The narrative of ideas concealed in this book first emerges closest to the surface in the chapter devoted to Schiller, and it is worth endeavouring to put them into an approximate form, as Jung describes a method which must not be passed over while psychology is so barren of methods. Schiller, brooding upon the problem of reaching freedom, and seeing it ultimately as an internal problem, discovers an antithesis of two basic instincts in himself. The
forces.

Jung regards on the one hand to the object and on the other to the subjective processes. The four functions that he distinguishes are not in themselves these directions, but become directed by the outward and inward acting forces, the *dynamis* of extraversion and introversion. As we exist we are quarters, or less than quarters, of what we are potentially capable of being. The psyche is quartered into sensation, intuition, feeling and thinking. Civilized life makes us onesided. Our value for it lies in our onesidedness. This man is a thinker; that a carpenter; this an artist. He is only man in this sense; in himself he is not yet man. "Outside this quarter-psyche, the other three quarters are in the darkness of repression and inferiority." This is barbarism. "Conscious capacity for onesidedness is a sign of the highest culture. But involuntary onesidedness is a sign of barbarism." Our barbarism is actual but concealed by the effect of civilization which makes us appear to be men. In ourselves we are nothing.

The antithesis, as Schiller conceived it, leads to an irresistible identification with one side or the other. To whichever of the pairs of opposites we side with we give an exclusive value, at the expense of the other. In this state there is never freedom and cannot be. What belongs to one side or to the other is in the mill of the opposites. If an orientation to a system that does not lie in the alternating systems of the opposites were possible, and the will found its content in what came out of this third system, it would work outside the influence of the mill. A third element is necessary. The will could decide, but cannot work decisively, because it must have a neutral content to work through. In our ordinary state it can find none save what is provided either by the sensuous or by the rational, each of which is a mutually exclusive instinct-force, so that the will can only go with and become lost in one or other instinct. "The will could indeed decide, but only if we anticipate the condition that must first be reached ... it is indeed the sign of the barbarous state that the will has a onesided determination through one function; yet the will must none the less have a content, an aim." The problem becomes one that is concerned with finding an aim and content for the will to act upon that is not given by one or other of the opposing processes, because "if we allow sensuous desire as a motive of will, we act in harmony with the one instinct against our rational judgment. Yet, if we transfer the adjustment of the dispute to rational judgment" then the rational instinct acts against the sensuous. The mediate position Jung finds in the symbolic work of the unconscious. The symbol reaches the intermediate position between the pairs of opposites. It must be made the content of the will. In giving a content to the will that is not taken from life, the possibilities of a unique internal psychological movement are given. The direction of this unique movement Jung discovers to be towards individuation, and is accompanied by the gradual balancing of the functions. It will be apparent that the essence of Jung's psychological attitude lies just here.
We can tell a man who thinks too much that he should feel more, but neither we nor he has any method. It may be that he has to think still more before he can feel, but we would not know this if it were so. We cannot balance functions by external judgment. The requisite intervening process Jung does not seek from life, because life has produced the misbalance. From the critical side we may ask, if another content for the will is sought outside life and is actually found, can the content be given a unique direction past the attractive forces of the pairs of opposites that await to absorb it? The assimilation of this special material with the ordinary material must tend to increase the subjective limitations. Also, with regard to the use of the term 'symbolic work of the unconscious,' we must believe that many dreams have little or no value in this sense; that there is every kind of dream, and some special ones. Jung, however, indicates a method here, which will be mentioned below. As regards the symbol, he points out that 'the rational functions are by their nature incapable of creating symbols, since they produce only a rational product necessarily restricted to a single meaning which forbids it from embracing its opposite. The sensuous functions are equally unfitted to create symbols, because from the very nature of the object they are also confined to single meanings, which comprehend only themselves and neglect the other. To discover, therefore, that impartial basis for the will we must appeal to another element where the opposites are not yet definitely divorced but still preserve their original unity. Manifestly, this is not a condition found in consciousness, since the whole nature of consciousness is discrimination. The separation into pairs of opposites is entirely due to conscious differentiation.” The appeal to consciousness for a decision between the pairs of opposites is thus unavailing. “We must descend deeper into those foundations of consciousness which have still preserved their primordial instinctiveness; namely, into the unconscious, where all psychic functions are indistinguishably merged in the original and fundamental activity of the psyche.” From this standpoint, Jung looks to the unconscious as containing the elements necessary for furnishing the will with contents that do not cause disharmony between the functions, to “that neutral region of the psyche,” whose products have an intermediate value. But these products are subliminal through feeble intensity and require re-enforcement. Energy must be added to the unconscious symbol, to increase its value and bring it into consciousness. It is here that Jung outlines the existence of a method. Schiller wrote that “the inherency of the root-instincts in no way contradicts the absolute unity of the mind, provided only that man distinguishes himself from both instincts. Both certainly exist and work in him; but in himself he is neither substance nor form, neither sensuousness nor reason.” The separability of an individual nucleus can lead to a differentiation of the self from the opposites. “This differentiation is equivalent to a detachment of energy from both sides and the disposable energy thus drawn away passes into the self.” It is introverted into the nucleus that is separable from the pairs of opposites. This introversion means that the energy “is held with the self and is prevented from participation in the conflicting opposites. Since the outward way is barred to it, it turns naturally towards thought, whereby it is again in danger of becoming
entangled in the conflict. Therefore this act of differentiation of the self from the opposites, and introversion, must also involve detachment from ideas. It becomes wholly objectless; it is no longer related to anything that could be a conscious content. It, therefore, sinks into the unconscious, where it automatically takes possession of the waiting phantasy material, which it actuates and urges towards consciousness.” Jung views this phantasy material thus animated in this special way as containing formulations for the psychological development of the individuality in its successive states. So far as the reviewer understands his presentation, he implies that energy separated and dealt with in this manner can rouse a specially appropriate symbol-response. The energy withdrawn from the pairs of opposites exhausts them temporarily. After a time they recuperate and the resumed conflict demands the same process. “This function of mediation between the opposites I have termed the transcendent function, by which I mean nothing mysterious, but merely a combined function of conscious and unconscious elements.” In a footnote he observes he is only presenting this function in principle. It must be observed that the struggle between the opposites requires to become internally apparent before this method is practicable. The usurpation of the onesided function and the whole mechanical set of the sequence of psychic processes prevents this. The feelings that occur in ordinary existence are perhaps scarcely thrown into strong enough relief, or sufficiently antagonized without the aid of special environmental factors.

In the subsequent chapter upon the type problem in poetry, in which Spitteler’s Epimetheus and Prometheus is interpreted, the reconciling symbol, as “a principle of dynamic regulation,” is discussed, and parallels drawn with Indian and Chinese philosophy. Taking Spitteler’s dramatic work as an unconscious product surcharged with a significance bearing on the present situation of civilization, which has a psychological problem as a whole, Jung reflects upon the nature of the reconciling symbol contained in the poem, which delivers humanity from the soulless moral routine into which it has fallen. He observes, from the history of redeeming symbols in general, that it must necessarily take a form that is rejected by the majority and be incompatible with all that is held in reverence. The work of the redeeming symbol is “equivalent to a great catastrophe, since a new and powerful life issues forth just where no life or force or new development was anticipated.” It might be equally true to say that a great catastrophe is the condition essential for the birth of a new symbol. From where otherwise comes the energy?

The type problem in psychiatry is noticed from the standpoint of a work by Otto Gross on cell-functions. The activity of the cerebral cell is divisible into two forms of functions. The primary function is connected with the production of a psychic process, such as a representation. The secondary function, following immediately on this, is connected with the re-establishment of the state in which the primary function is again rendered possible. Intensity of affect in the primary functioning gives a prolonged secondary function. Gross considers that it leads to restriction in the choice of associations to whatever has been represented in the primary function. The question arises if, in cases where the restitution phase or secondary function is prolonged,
there may not be certain psychological peculiarities connected with this condition. A brief secondary function will influence fewer consecutive associations, and at the same time re-establish the primary function more speedily. The psychological picture in such a case would show a constant and rapidly renewed readiness for action and re-action, hence a capacity for deviation, a tendency to superficiality of associative connections and a lack of deeper, more integrated, connections. Abbreviation of the secondary function interferes with any real intellectual process, while intense prolongation of it, and pathological impeding of it, would account for the phenomenon of perseveration. Jung suggests that the introvert psychology is connected with a prolonged secondary function, but considers the affective intensity of the primary function as the decisive factor in producing this. The extravert psychology corresponds to a short and weak primary function with a transient secondary function.

The historical treatment of the type problem, which makes a difficult beginning to the book, is introduced by a passage from Heine. "Plato and Aristotle! They are not merely two systems; they are also types of two distinct human natures which from immemorial time, under every sort of cloak, stand more or less inimically opposed. But pre-eminently the whole mediaeval period was riven by this conflict, persisting even to the present day . . ." Locke thought that irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion has a psychological origin, and no reference to anything existing objectively in the disputes. In following the acrimonious war between the nominalists and realists in the Middle Ages, and tracing their antecedent representation in the Platonic, Megaric and Cynic schools, Jung sees the ever-renewed battle between extravert and introvert psychology, the one laying the emphasis on the object, the other on the idea. The theological disputes concerning transubstantiation are viewed in the same light. Radbertus, in the ninth century, advanced the doctrine that the wine and bread were transformed into the actual blood and body of Christ, which doctrine was opposed by Scotus Erigena, who sought only the symbolical idea. The trend of the period was concretistic and extraverted. Scotus Erigena was murdered by his own monks. There is a passage in Burnet's History of the Reformation in which he observes that when the doctrine of the corporeal presence was first received in the Western Church, "they believed that the whole loaf was turned into one entire body of Christ, so that in the distribution one had an eye, a nose or an ear, another a tooth, finger or toe, a third a collop or a piece of tripe." In the later controversy between Luther and Zwingli, Jung points out that Luther showed the extraverted attitude.

The latter third of the book is occupied with an extensive presentation of types in all combinations. The original extraverted and introverted types are referred to as general attitude types, distinguished by the direction of general interest or energy movement, and Jung adds to them the function types, which depend upon what the most differentiated function is in an individual's adaptation or orientation to life. He observes that nature knows two fundamentally different ways by which the living organism continues its existence: "the one is by increased fertility, accompanied by a relatively small degree
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of defensive power and individual conservation; the other is by individual equipment of manifold means of self-protection, coupled with a relatively insignificant fertility." He points out that the peculiarity of the extravert in constantly spending and propagating himself in every sense, and the characteristic of the introvert in defending and conserving himself from any expenditure of energy directly related to the object, can be connected with this fundamental biological distinction. His portrayals of the various function-types are drawn with their own freshness and subtlety, and strike a different note in the book. A chapter of definitions follows, in which the technical terms used in the book are explained. In the conclusion he envisages the main trend of his investigations. Every psychological type has its own validity and sees part of the truth. The fault is, as Pascal wrote, not that we follow an error, but that we do not follow another truth. The existence of mutually contradictory theories concerning the same process is inevitable, owing to the type-problem. The only alternative is to found a sect and claim universal validity, and hold out as long as possible. The necessity for a plurality of explanation in the case of psychological theories is therefore, from his standpoint, inevitable. It must be said that this is impossible in the world, which must continue to live in hostile sects. We have to notice that psychology is beginning to pass towards a region in which the understanding of it is only possible through the experiencing of it. There is understanding that is reached only in this way, and which otherwise falls away to nothing. What is necessary for its further extension and existence becomes a problem.

Those who take the view that this richly-stored book—which is without parallel—is irrelevant to practical work or is not 'scientific' cannot have perceived the main problem that confronts the psychological sproutings that shot up so suddenly during this century.

There is an explanatory introduction by Dr. H. G. Baynes, who has also provided a good index. The translation is workmanlike and consistent.

MAURICE NICOLL.

Fisiopatologia delle Sindromi Parkinsoniane. By Dr. FEDELE NEGRO.


Dr. Negro has written a useful compendium of the symptomatology and pathological physiology of Parkinson's disease. It is characterized by a thoroughly modern outlook in respect of such problems as muscle tone and involuntary movements, and is marked by erudition and clinical acumen. The references to the literature are up to date and numerous; but although the bibliography extends to no less than twenty-three pages, there are not a few allusions in the text to papers not specified in it.

Some forty pages are devoted to muscle tonus and about an equal number to the symptoms of Parkinson's disease attributable to tone disorder. Dr. Negro is led from his researches to suggest that there are two extrapyramidal paths concerned with tone: (1) a cerebellar-rubro-deitero-spinal, and (2) a pallido-nigro-subthalamico-spinal. Pallido-nigro-rubral connections exercise an inhibitory action on tone impulses transmitted from the cerebellum to the
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