increased intracranial pressure of one year's duration and a positive Bordet-Wassermann reaction in the blood and cerebrospinal fluid. At autopsy, an endothelioma was found to extend from the lamina terminalis and the optic chiasma to the junction of the aqueductus sylvii and third ventricle. The cortex showed changes compatible with those of general paralysis.

LEWIS YEALLAND.

Psychopathology.

PSYCHOLOGY.

[80] Materialism, past and present.—BERTRAND RUSSELL. Psyche, 1924, v, 111.

COMMENTING on the persistent vitality of the materialistic system of thought, the author examines Lange's views as exploited in his 'History of Materialism,' about to be reissued. Lange believed that materialism is unable to explain consciousness and is scientifically refuted by the psychology and physiology of sensation. In considering what is true and what false in materialism, it is doubtful whether any substantially new arguments have been produced since Greek times. The author rejects the theory of psychophysical parallelism, and presumably that of deterministic psychology also. With the disintegration of ancient orthodoxies, materialism is replaced by scepticism. It still exists in Russia and America as a protest against traditional theology. The materialistic dogmas are expressed by the belief in the sole reality of matter and the reign of law. Apart from the belief in the reality of sensation, the sole reality of matter is now disputed by physics, which produces the theory of relativity. Time merged into space-time interferes with the notion of substance more than philosophy does. A piece of matter has become a system of interrelated events. Nothing is permanent and nothing endures. The reign of law must include human volition if it is to become part of the materialistic outlook. As a margin of error exists in all observations it cannot be proved that events obey any law exactly. Even in physics the reign of law is not indubitably universal, and in biology and psychology this doubt becomes increased. Controversies between determinism and free-will spring from a conflict between the desire for safety and the desire for power. In the present time Haldane maintains that living phenomena cannot be explained solely in terms of chemistry and physics, while Loeb stands for the mechanistic view. The behaviouristic school of psychology has shown a materialistic tendency by denying that introspection is an independent source of scientific knowledge. If the tendency of some psychologists to regard consciousness as a dubious term and 'thought' and 'reason' as analogous to processes of learning among animals reducible to the law of habit should prove correct, belief in psychological materialism will become easier. Materialism may be accepted if it means that the good of every science is to be merged into physics. There is, however, no good reason to suppose that materialism is metaphysically true.

ROBERT M. RIGGALL.

Examples of poems are quoted from the répertoire of a student of nineteen, whose best work was created in a dissociated state. His conscious efforts lacked the true poetic quality and could have been as well expressed in prose. From this case the author concludes that a ‘complex’ is an important factor, both in the production and the appreciation of a poem; also, that the poet does not always understand the meaning of his own poetry. The poem written in a hypnoidal condition and later subjected by the poet to conscious criticism, frequently suffers from his censorship. The following example from the above-mentioned case is quoted as an illustration:

“ There a sighing lane is turning
As a snake with drowsy coil;
It probes into the vegies shadows
As though seeking rainbow spoil.”

The beautiful word ‘vagies,’ coined by the poet, suggests much more than the substituted word ‘shadows.’

ROBERT M. RIGGALL.


Consciousness may be represented as a triangle with its base downwards, composed from apex to base of the field of awareness, the foreconscious, the personal unconscious (including the intrauterine unconscious) and the racial unconscious. The unconscious is composed of material once conscious in the life of the individual and of material conscious only in the life of the race. This unanalyzable racial unconscious is deduced by comparative methods. The writer compares the savages’ methods of counting with those of Europeans (Roman numerals and counting by twenties). Philology is of special importance in this connection. More attention should be paid to the motor components (process) as opposed to the perceptive aspects (content) of consciousness.

Much light may be thrown on the psychoses (dementia praecox, for example) by some conception of the history of the psyche, the psychical situation and the racial background of consciousness.

E. B. G. R.


Dr. William Brown understands religion to be a mental attitude towards the universe and the totality of existence. This attitude is cognitive, aesthetic and ethical. He also recognizes an attitude of complete dependence upon the universe which comes into play after these three attitudes have found expression. The historical approach, concerned with the evolution of religion from magic to polytheism and monotheism, is considered to lend itself to arguing in a circle. The writer believes that after the profane sciences have been examined distinctively religious experience stands out as an entity. This definite experience requires analysis in order to connect it with experiences not generally recognized as religious, and it is the task of psychology to do this.
ABSTRACTS

It is considered that the psychological attitude inhibits the comprehensive stability of the religious attitude. Because psychology, as such, cannot do justice to the validity of knowledge, the same will apply to its application to religion. The author, therefore, finds it necessary to supplement his psychology with philosophy. Certain psychoanalysts are criticized on the plea that they explain away the main facts of the Christian religion in terms of psychopathology. These arguments are criticized along theoretical and practical lines. These psychoanalysts explain the normal mind in terms of the abnormal without distinguishing the normal from the abnormal. Physiological change cannot be explained in terms of pathology. The author argues that because the pathological processes of projection and regression and the effects of the Oedipus complex are diminished or eliminated by psychoanalysis, therefore religious consciousness should also be eliminated. He found that the effect of his personal analysis was the exact opposite. He is more convinced than ever that religion is the most important thing in life, and that it is essential to mental health. He has, moreover, obtained similar results in his own patients.

ROBERT M. RIGGALL.


In this paper, which is a contribution to the Morton Prince Commemoration Volume, McDougall criticizes Freud’s views on group psychology. He commences in a sarcastic vein and accuses Freud of inconsistency in his remarks on individual peculiarities in the group and in his use of the words ‘cruel,’ ‘brutal’ and ‘destructive’ as applied to instincts. Freud recognizes McDougall’s fundamental paradox of group psychology, namely, that although the crowd degrades the individual below his normal level, it is only by group life that man rises above the level of animal life. McDougall complains that in spite of this recognition, Freud rejects his explanation of organization and merely restates the problem without suggesting an alternative solution. He also complains that his theory of the intensified emotional reaction of crowds is misunderstood because Freud states that he (McDougall) explains the fact “by means of the emotional contagion with which we are already familiar.” McDougall protests that he does not so explain the data and endeavours at some length to show that although le Bon treats this emotional contagion as a manifestation of suggestion he believes it to be a fundamental phenomenon quite distinct. In his Introduction to Social Psychology he states that he clearly distinguishes these points and propounds a distinct theory of suggestion which Freud appears to have overlooked. He argues that in gregarious animals there is a distinct and specific instinct of submission, and that this is the main conative factor at work in true suggestion. He states that Freud has not attempted to define ego-instincts, but that if he had he would have found them identical with the instincts of self-assertion and submission. McDougall now proceeds to quarrel with Freud’s theory of libidinal ties on the one hand to the leader, and on the other hand to the other members of the group. He suggests that these ties may have been asserted to be present by Freud in order to make group psychology a mere annex of his psychoanalytic system. Freud’s distinction between true panic and mere collective
fear, the former characterized by the death of the leader, is now examined. He thinks that this theory should have been supported by citations of authentic cases from the late war. McDougall regards a panic as a function of an instinct operating in an unorganized group and not as a function of the group mind as stated by Freud. A later statement shows that he is unable to understand Freud's comprehensive libido theory; he thinks it would be much simpler to recognize parental love as quite different from the sexual instinct. He supports his preference for an independent parental instinct by remarking that in most animals the two instincts operate quite independently. The group as a revival of the primal horde is criticized on the score that less extravagant explanations are possible. It leaves the leaderless group unexplained. It fails to explain the suggestibility of the members of a group toward one another. Finally, it reduces all social life to the working of an atavistic regression and makes sexual jealousy and envy the roots of noble manifestations but leaves these roots unexplained. McDougall concludes by saying, "not proven and wildly improbable." He, personally, intends to try and avoid the spell of the primal horde father.

Robert M. Riggall.


The main object of this article appears to be a laudable desire to sweep away the cobwebs still present in the minds of the majority of medical men. The teaching of clinical psychology in our medical schools is neglected because medievil metaphysics is still firmly embedded in Victorian science. Modern psychotherapy will not become generally accepted until the belief is dispelled that a disease must be seen on a plate after death. Attention is particularly drawn to those cases in which psychical and physical disorders appear to be evenly balanced. Having superficially discussed the teaching of Freud, Jung and Adler, the author shows a distinct leaning to the views of the latter, stating that each physician tends to develop his technique in terms of his own life-history. He objects to the Freudian technique in the cases mentioned, because of its tedious nature and the difficulties of dealing with transference and resistance. He thinks that in employing Adler's method the relation of the physical symptoms to a psychical state can be confidently pointed out at once, and transference can be avoided. Adler's method means less insistence on the sexual factor, and this means freedom from embarrassment for both patient and physician.

Robert M. Riggall.


It was thought that the investigation of children's answers to the question: "Suppose that a fairy were to grant you three wishes. What would your wishes be?" might prove a useful addition to a questionnaire on interests designed for use with children who show behaviour difficulties. Only two children objected to answering the question, both of them on the ground that they "could not think of anything to wish for." Both of them were suffering
from serious emotional disturbances and appeared to have great difficulty in coming to a decision on any subject. Taken as a group, the children showed marked interest in the question and did not treat it flippantly. No attempt at statistical evaluation of the responses was made, but the results obtained appear to indicate that the question is often useful in the analysis of the causative factors of behaviour in individual cases. Anxieties, phobias, feelings of inferiority, attitudes toward reality and the social activities, all show themselves in the nature of these childish wishes. It is in accordance with expectation that the wishes of the older children should frequently have reference to their vocational ambitions. In many instances these wishes were expressed in their simplest forms—“to be a lawyer,” “that I could get to be a doctor,” and so forth, but interesting elaborations also appeared—“To be a successful man in business, commonly known as the ‘Big Boss’—one who sits behind and pulls the strings.” It seems probable that over-compensation for a real feeling of inferiority is at work in this case. Unhappy home conditions are sometimes hinted at in some wishes. One wish was significant—“For a nice home and mother.” Another was, “That I would be loved by my fokes.” A number of the older children wished for better clothes, and here the financial condition of the children was definitely below the average of the social group in which they were placed. Marriage was referred to in two cases. One of these was referred by the school authorities to the clinic because of day-dreaming and masturbation.

It need hardly be said that to accept material such as this at its literal value without further investigation or interpretation in the light of known facts would frequently lead to serious error. Data of this kind are valuable for two purposes: they may throw additional light upon factors already known, but imperfectly understood, or they may suggest further methods of approach to a study of the child’s emotional attitudes and the causes that have operated to produce these attitudes. From these studies so far it would appear that the question is likely to have little value with children whose mental ages are below nine years. The responses of such children are likely to be very trivial and circumstantial. The most significant responses are likely to come from children in the early adolescent or pre-adolescent period.

C. S. R.


Sleep is a state and not a function; it is a condition in which various functions are in abeyance. The ‘sleep’ of various plants is little else than a façon de parler; but in the case of animals sleep is of vast importance, and can be shown to depend on both internal and external factors. In the case of hibernation it is specially significant to note that the sleeping state has nothing to do with fatigue. Evidence has been adduced which goes to prove that the winter sleep of animals is a derivative of endocrine action; the hedgehog, for example, can be roused out of its hibernating state and awakened into activity for hours or days by the injection of 1 mgm. of thyroid substance.

In the case of man, sleep is characterized in the first instance by psycho-
logical rather than physiological signs; the chief, of course, is the loss of consciousness. Sleep and a conscious ego mutually exclude each other. The ego-consciousness being without doubt a function of the cortex as a whole, we can scarcely speak of a sleep centre in any psychological sense. The cause of this loss of consciousness must, nevertheless, be sought. It cannot be ascribed to fatigue in any exclusive sense, for obvious reasons; the author develops with some ingenuity the view that innervation processes keep the cortex awake, and that when these fail or are insufficient the cortex falls asleep—in other words, physiological unconsciousness supervenes. He addsuce evidence, in the next place, which, in his opinion, suggests that there is an actual brain area from which these postulated stimuli pass to the cortex, and this ‘waking-centre’ he localizes in the basal ganglia, regio subthalamica, and mesencephalon. When it is impaired in function by disease, the cortex is not longer “kept awake,” and sleep ensues.

The paper is interesting and stimulating, but not a few of the author’s deductions from the known facts of epidemic encephalitis, for instance, are highly speculative.

S. A. K. W.

PSYCHOSES.


In the conception of autism, as elaborated by Bleuler, two factors can be distinguished; these may act separately, but only in their combination is autism brought about. They may best be described as (1) introversion (in the wider sense), and (2) regression. The varying content of the autistic state depends on variation in the form of regression.

The special dissociative type of autism, such as is seen in schizophrenia and in the dream state, is through regression directed to an autoerotic or archaic stage, recognizable by the fact that in it independent organization of both personality and ‘non-ego’ is imperfectly developed, with the result that these cannot be properly separated. By the conception of dissociation is understood the breaking down, the ‘dilapidation,’ of personal psychical organization, though this of itself will not explain the peculiar form of primitive thinking which makes its appearance therewith. Psychologically, affective dementia cannot be explained solely by this dissolution of psychical associations.

Projection is explicable by the state of introversion, while its phenomena, as far as their character is concerned, depend on regression, and the interaction of the two seriously hinders return to a normal state on the part of the schizophrenic or makes it frankly impossible. In an early stage of schizophrenia undeniable evidence of feeling and occasionally of its repression can be obtained in some instances; but with gradually increasing regression the affective dementia becomes more obvious, since personality, which experiences feelings and can repress them, is disappearing.

J. S. P.