PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY.

Psycho-analytic Rev., 1920, vii, 213.

There are many who, though following Freud largely in his psychology, find it difficult to accept the concept of an agency so wholly in the pattern of the conscious but working within the unconscious as is the case with Freud's censorship. The author thinks that the clue to the nature of such a process should be sought rather in the realms of physiology than sociology. He would assume that there is an organization of unconscious experience in which there are a number of levels in which adult experience would be higher in position than that of the youth, and this again would be above the experience of childhood and infancy. Each level more recently acquired would control an earlier one. Such an organization would be similar to the functional levels of the nervous system. Each level would not only have its own particular material, but also its own characteristic methods of feeling, thinking, and acting. The character of the dream could then be sufficiently explained by the removal of higher controlling levels in sleep, so that lower levels with their infantile mode of expression can manifest themselves in their natural guise. The latent content is not distorted through any censor, but because the form in which this content manifests itself depends on something inherent in the experience which forms the latent content or inherent in the mode of activity by which it is expressed. Without the control of later experience the dream experience must take the form proper to it. Nevertheless, Freud's conception that the dream has a protective and defensive function may be a factor which has assisted the survival of the dream as a feature of mental activity; but this has been unduly emphasized.

Slips of the tongue or pen may also be thus more satisfactorily explained than by any censor, by presuming that earlier phases of thought ordinarily held in check by later developments gain sway through fatigue or some such factor causing temporary failure of inhibition. The concept of a guardian watching at the threshold of consciousness does seem to apply well to the repression of the unpleasant; but as the censorship only explains some facts, it is probably only a secondary process, a later addition to one which has a more deeply-seated origin.

Hysterical disability is amply explained by a process in which the higher levels are put in abeyance, so that the lower levels find mimetic and symbolic expression as a refuge from conflict, just as the savage is content with a mimetic representation of some wish which fulfils for him all the purposes of reality. It is pointed out that the hysterical abrogation of control is closely connected with suggestion, which process is seen from the study of savage peoples and animals to be primitive, so that hysteria may be regarded as the coming into activity of an early form of reaction to a dangerous or difficult situation. Freud's censorship is therefore an artificial and unnecessary conception in hysteria.

In the sphere of motor activity as seen in false strokes in work or play, Rivers sees failures of adjustment due either to weakening of control
or disturbances in the controlled tendencies to movement. Though these are manifestations of nervous functioning similar to those which Freud explains by his concept of the censorship, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to trace its activity in them. The same may be said of tics, where instinctive reactions gain the upper hand.

In conclusion, the author sees confirmation of his ideas in the study of human culture, and points out that every kind of human society reveals a hierarchical arrangement in which higher ranks control the lower, and inhibit or suppress activities belonging to earlier phases of culture. Here the process of censorship forms only a very small part of the total mass of inhibiting forces. In times of stress, control exerted by more recent developments of social activity is weakened and the earlier levels reveal themselves in symbolic forms.

C. Stanford Read.


The theory is here developed that sleep is a functional rest or suspension of the affective activity of the personality. Psychical activities may be divided into two fundamental categories, affective and intellective. The former, which includes activities of attention and volition, is incessantly in action. That is to say, certain fundamental interests, professional pursuits, and the like, determine the daily reactions of the individual and are in functional activity from morning to night. There is, moreover, another secondary affectivity, which is the desire of not deceiving one's self, the fear of not acting in the most appropriate way, and the anxiety to behave in the most becoming manner. This serves to hold in check and control the fundamental affective activity which continually urges to action. During the day, then, gradual exhaustion of the affective potential energy takes place. It is otherwise with the intellective activities, by which is understood the simple evocation of sensorial and mnemonic-sensorial elements. Though numerous images may be excited during the day, they are very varied, and none of them last long enough or repeat themselves with enough insistence to exhaust the energy of their respective nervous centres. It is thus the exhausted affectivity which ceases to be active during sleep, while the sensorial elements remain active in the form of dreams.

This theory is supported by reference to the psychological characteristics of dreams. The author finds these to be: (1) Non-affectivity; (2) Incoherence; (3) Illogicalism. He finds evidence of affective silence in dreams on the following grounds: Dreams are not related to significant daily interests, but to indifferent matters; the absence of emotions such as surprise and shame in respect of dream situations which in waking life would provoke strong reactions; and the purely physiological basis of anxiety dream states. Given this non-affectivity, the other dream characteristics follow as a natural sequence. The failure of that evoking, directing, selective, and inhibitory action, which is the function of affective conative tendencies, produces an anarchial, planless activity of sensory reminiscences.
which are readily forgotten, easily induced by indifferent stimuli, and subject to constant metamorphoses. The illogicalism is due to the suspension of the secondary affective tendency—the critical spirit. In waking life this is in opposition to our fundamental interests. It prevents us from making mistakes or acting stupidly; but in dream life the most ridiculous situations in which we find ourselves are accepted as a matter of course, without surprise or vexation. Thus dreams may be defined as "an ideative anarchy consequent on the cessation of all affective control".

H. Devine.


The author undertakes a comprehensive review of the problems to which instinctive phenomena give rise. He defines instincts as inherited inborn organizations of the nervous system of a species through which a specific stimulus, arising either from within or without the organism, automatically and independently of any previous experience brings about appropriate reactions with ekphoria. This is reminiscent of Hering's aphorism, "Instinct is the inherited memory of the species". Dynamically considered, the instincts are merely the functional aspect of the life interest (Horme) of the species. In lower organisms there is laid down, in the form of an hereditary structural mechanism, not only the general life-programme of the species, but also in greater or less degree the detailed reactions through which it may be realized. The author agrees with Loeb that owing to close relationship existing between function and structure, especially in insects, it is practically impossible to separate the instincts from the vegetative processes of growth and development. In the words of Reuter, "The body produces exactly the material with which the instinct works".

As the evolutionary scale is ascended, inherited automatic mechanisms become increasingly inadequate to carry out the organism's life-interest, and higher cephalic functions are developed to assume control over the more primitive (Prinzip der Wandering der Function nach dem Frontalende). Thus the complicated instincts of high animals (especially man) are not 'fixed', but take the form of plastic inherited predispositions. The freedom of action which this would seem to imply is, however, only apparent, for the inherited disposition acting as an affective censor exercises a far-reaching control over experience. Instincts are classified, according to the life interest which they subserve, under one or other of two headings—self-preservation or preservation of the species. The ekphoria of the instincts normally is bound up with a complex energetic situation which embraces either interoceptive conditions—morphological and biochemical—or exteroceptive conditions—the appearance of a specific sense-excitation. Experience exercises a twofold influence upon instinctive processes. The first is exemplified by the 'conditional reflexes' of Pavlov. The second is due to the constant conflict of interests which conduces to plasticity of response, though it does not actually modify the instinct itself. As the subjective correlates of the primary instinctive impulses, certain (psychical)
feelings come into being—the Urgefuhle of von Monakow. These are in themselves objectless, i.e., independent of external sensory experience; yet they orientate us in search after the actual external energetic situation. Normally the course of an instinctive action proceeds to its goal by phases, each of which is associated with a certain satisfaction. If during any phase the object of the instinct is withdrawn, the organism manifests dissatisfaction and seeks for the lost stimulus (Sekundären Reizsuchung). Should this search be unsuccessful, the instinct pursues a more or less abnormal course. Five such are distinguished. If two instincts with opposed interests come into conflict, there results, according to circumstances, either (a) complete repression of one or the other, usually the more primitive, or (b) a compromise between the two. The first possibility allows of successful sublimation, the latter gives rise to so-called hysterical symptoms. Pathological anomalies of the instinctive life (Hormopathien) are classified, according to their genesis, under the headings of primary (endogenous) and secondary (exogenous).

Alfred Carver.


Dr. Southard reviews the main factors in the production of the world-situation of to-day. Trade unionism is a movement without concrete philosophy, with an unfathomed history and an unpredictable future. ‘Ology’ and ‘ism’ interact and are interdependent. Marxian Socialism was based on the ideas of many philosophers—Hegel, Saint-Simon, Adam Smith and his followers—and in turn influenced the German schools of political economy and jurisprudence. Marx stood for self-help. Sismondi cried, “Is wealth everything? Are men nothing?” Statisticians built on the ‘average man’; Ricardian economists on the ‘economic man’, making man a machine. British economics gave us the theory of prosperity on its tripod of wealth, wages, and profit. The great war, and the fulminating embarrassments of the present in the effort toward reconstruction, may have arisen from: (1) The bad morals and faulty education of the people or their leaders; or (2) A falsely evolving jural system with excessive accent, now on social control, now on individual liberty; or (3) A blind economic development. But in facing these problems the omission of theory, science, or philosophy would be a catastrophe. The complete history of Bolshevism cannot be written without a thorough account of the psychopathic personalities contributing to it, and, primarily, to the great war. The noble endeavours of Head, of Heart, and of the Long Arm in scientific management, social welfare, and social justice have been of little avail. Science, moralists, and lawyers have had their influence. To-day the individual categories of medicine, the art which of all arts has always taken the individual as its object, are called to serve in such complicated fields as that of trade unionism (which seems a phenomenon of mass psychology). Industrial psychiatry is already a subject of investigation by (a) psychologists, (b) psychiatrists, and (c) sociologists.
The pooling of psychiatry and economics has proved productive. Its application to trade unionism awaits us. Mass psychology is little understood; in it temperament has no positive value, and at present can only be described in terms of the individual. Yet from this standpoint there is much that is instructive; and on something of these analytic lines the psychiatrist may help to solve like problems. Hoxie spent ten years in the intensive study of trade unionism, and evolved a theory of four functional types: (1) Business-, (2) Uplift-, (3) Revolutionary-, and (4) Predatory-unionism. These respectively correspond to the four classical temperaments of Hippocrates and Galen: the phlegmatic, the sanguine, the melancholic, and the choleric. These 'humours' were described with rare insight and emphasis, which is approximately confirmed by the endocrine researches of to-day.

1. Business unionism is a logical machine, avoids extremes, accepts the existent wage system, and seeks, by mutual support and occasional strikes, the best terms for its members. Its purview is narrow, being confined to the craft or trade.

2. Uplift unionism accepts not only the wage but the whole social system. Its purest type is found only in the Women's League, but its ideas more or less permeate the 'business' forms. Its effective keynote is sympathy, which has oft-changing foci in spheres of welfare work. Its utility is heightened by the cyclothymic tendency of the sanguine temperament.

3. Revolutionary unionism or Syndicalism requires the overthrow of the whole socio-economic order by and for the working class; its variants are socialistic and quasi-anarchistic. The revolutionary advocates direct action and violence; but in contradistinction to this, his philosophy of life is a fixed hypothesis of world passivity, finding its counterpart in his own emotional tone. A parallel is found in the confirmed melancholic who, especially if of advanced years, thinks around set ideas, which in the insane are delusions.

4. Predatory unionism is lawless, favours secret violence, and tends to anarchism. It is without philosophy, and seeks only its own immediate advantage. It is based on instinct, acts on impulse, and is more picturesque than significant.

Should this analysis prove fundamentally correct, the problems of trade unionism will be met with much more understanding and sympathy; and the psychiatrist will have a large contribution to sociology in this and other fields.

JOHN GIFFORD.

TREATMENT.


This is a report of work which has been carried on at the Danvers State Hospital, where it has been attempted to adopt ideas of rehabilitation to chronic demented patients and thereby fit them into some social group.