Observing one’s hand become anarchic: An fMRI study of action identification

doi:10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00079-5

Consciousness and Cognition

Volume 12, Issue 4, December 2003, Pages 597-608

https://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00079-5 Get rights and content

Abstract

The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one’s own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else’s actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one’s own movement and its visual consequences with an abrupt mismatch between one’s own movement and somebody else’s visually perceived hand movement. A right fronto-parietal network was selectively active during a sudden mismatch between one’s own observed and performed hand action.

Introduction

The first intuition one has when thinking about the self is that it is a unitary entity that remains relatively stable across time. Accordingly, social psychologists and memory researchers have long treated the self as if it were a mental concept to which perceptions, emotions, memories, etc. become linked (e.g., Baumeister, 1998). However, recent work in philosophy (Metzinger, 2003), psychology (Neisser, 1994; Wegner, 2002), and neuroscience (Frith & Frith, 1999; Jeannerod, 1999; Kircher & David, 2003; Ruby & Decety, 2001) suggests that the self actually needs to be conceptualized as consisting of a number of interacting subsystems that often involve perception, intention, and action (Proust, 2000). Together, these subsystems might form a self-model that underlies our subjective experience (Metzinger, 2000). One important function of such a self-model is the ability to distinguish between events that occur as a result of one’s own actions and events that occur as the result of somebody else’s actions (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Knoblich & Flach, 2001; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). Before we report an functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study that further explored which brain networks implement this ability, we provide a short overview of prior research on brain networks that allow one to distinguish between the consequences of our own and others’ actions.

Section snippets

Previous research

A first relevant area of research is the study of brain systems responsible for conflict monitoring. It is now well established that there are areas in the brain that are selectively active as soon as action conflicts arise. The most important structure in this context is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, cf. Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). This area is active for instance, when an incongruent stimulus is presented in the Stroop task, when attention needs to be divided in

The present study

The present study aimed to further explore the brain networks that contribute to identifying one’s own actions. In particular, we were interested in the question of which brain areas enable us to attribute visually perceived hand movements to our own or somebody else’s actions. In earlier studies, this question has been addressed by assessing brain activity in response to either temporally distorted feedback (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001; Leube et al., in press) or spatially distorted

Method

Six healthy right-handed participants lay in the scanner in a supine position. They wore earphones and looked into a mirror that reflected a screen. As soon as they heard an acoustical signal they started to continuously open and close their right hand with a frequency of approximately 1 Hz for the whole open–close cycle. In the open position fingers were fully extended. In the closed position the fingers formed an open fist. The action was filmed with an MRI compatible video camera (Wild et

Perform and observe (Interval 2)

For this differential contrast, brain activation in the OTHER condition was subtracted from the brain activation during the SELF condition. Thus, the remaining brain activations indicate higher brain activity, when participants observed their own hand actions compared to foreign hand actions. Table 1 shows the results. The only regions that were more active while observing one’s own actions were in the right inferior occipital cortex and the left middle occipital cortex. It is likely that the

Discussion

The main result of the present study is that a right fronto-parietal network was selectively active, when a sudden mismatch between one’s own observed and performed hand action occurred. This mismatch consisted in observing one’s hand moving on, despite having stopped the actual action. Thus, the fronto-parietal network seems to have become active when an established self-attribution of visually observed actions was violated. There seem to be two highly selective conditions for this network to

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Observing one’s hand become anarchic: An fMRI study of action identification

Abstract

Introduction

Section snippets

Previous research

The present study

Method

Perform and observe (Interval 2)

Discussion

Cognition

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Neuroimage

Neuroimage

Neuroimage

Consciousness & Cognition

Cognition

Magnetic Resononace Imaging

Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation

Nature Neuroscience

Spatio-temporal prediction modulates the perception of self-produced stimuli

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

The cerebellum is involved in predicting the sensory consequnces of action

Neuroreport

The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity experiences: Evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring

Psychological Medicine

From the perception of action to the understanding of intention

Nature Reviews Neuroscience

Conflict monitoring and cognitive control

Psychological Review

The neural consequences of conflict between intention and the senses

Brain

Self-monitoring in schizophrenia revisited

NeuroReport

Defective recognition of one’s own actions in patients with schizophrenia

American Journal of Psychiatry

The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia

Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences

Interacting minds—a biological basis

Science