Review
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

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Abstract

Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the ‘minimal self’, a self devoid of temporal extension, and the ‘narrative self’, which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga’s left-hemisphere ‘interpreter’ and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.

Section snippets

Self-reference and misidentification

There are a number of ways to understand the notion of a minimal sense of self. In this section, I approach the problem by discussing how we use the first-person pronoun in a self-referring way that should never permit a mistake. This kind of self-reference has a feature that some philosophers call ‘immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun’5. I will refer to this as the immunity principle (see Glossary). Once this principle is clarified we can ask

A neurocognitive model of immediate self-awareness

A brief consideration of motor action will help to clarify two closely related aspects of minimal self-awareness: self-ownership – the sense that it is my body that is moving; and self-agency – the sense that I am the initiator or source of the action. In the normal experience of voluntary or willed action, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership coincide and are indistinguishable. When I reach for a cup, I know this to be my action. This coincidence may be what leads us to think of

The minimal self: embodied or disembodied?

Taking the immunity principle as a point of departure, there are two other directions that one could follow. The first explores the idea that there is an even more primitive and embodied sense of self than that involved in the use of the first-person pronoun. This approach pursues the implications of what developmental psychologists have recently discovered about the experience of neonates. The second involves a more abstract self-reflective access to first-person experience, which, among other

The self extended and mediated by narrative

So far we have considered only a minimal self, which is a concept of self that seems quite at odds with our common-sense conception of who we are. Surely we think and speak of ourselves as entities extended in time? Indeed, it seems undeniable that we have memories and that we make plans, and that there is continuity between our past and our future. And do we not, as selves with individual identity, encompass that continuous experience? What is the nature of this sense of a continuous self? Is

Further extensions of the narrative self

In the current context of contentious disagreements on a large range of issues surrounding the self3, a general consensus among a diverse group of cognitive scientists concerning the constitution of the narrative self might seem surprising. However, it is perhaps even more surprising that there is some consensus within philosophy on this point, even across the great divide between continental and analytical philosophers. What Dennett, Neisser, Gazzaniga and Pribram have to say about the

Concluding remarks

In a recent book, Damasio has insightfully captured the difficulty involved in expressing the interrelations between the minimal (‘core’) self and the narrative (‘autobiographical’) self46. The difficulty is due to complexities that are apparent on both the personal and the sub-personal, neurological levels. Episodic memory, which is necessary for the construction of the narrative self, is subject to constant remodeling under the influence of factors that include innate and acquired

Outstanding questions

  • •

    What relationship exists between the minimal self and the narrative self? Is one generated from the other? Do they operate independently of each other?

  • •

    Shoemaker5 has maintained that immunity to error does not necessarily extend to episodic memory. What status do truth-claims concerning episodic memory have?

  • •

    Because the sense of self-agency is absent both in the case of involuntary thoughts and in cases of schizophrenic experiences of inserted thoughts, the lack of a sense of self-agency by

Acknowledgements

I thank S-J. Blakemore, U. Neisser, G. Strawson, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Parts of my research were supported by a fellowship at the NEH Summer Institute on Mind, Self, and Psychopathology, directed by J. Whiting and L. Sass at Cornell University in 1998, and by a sabbatical leave from Canisius College in 1999.

Glossary

Immunity principle
When a speaker uses the first-person pronoun (‘I’) to refer to him or herself, she cannot make a mistake about the person to whom she is referring. Philosophers call this ‘immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun’5.
Minimal self
Phenomenologically, that is, in terms of how one experiences it, a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time. The minimal self almost certainly depends on brain processes

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